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The Concept of Utopia 
‘Utopia’ is a neologism coined by Sir Thomas More in 15161 based on a pun on the Greek eutopia 
meaning ‘good place’ and outopia meaning ‘no place’.2 The concept is thus ambiguous and 
paradoxical: it implies positioning in time and space, yet also non-existence and elusiveness. 
Utopia has a particular resonance with anarchism, since it implies a lifeworld outside and beyond 
the usual terrain of politics, which celebrates the role of the imagination. Utopianism is an 
approach to social change that starts from the premise that there is something wrong with the 
world, and proceeds to dream and imagine how things might be if circumstances were radically 
changed. Utopias can take a variety of forms: the best known are fiction, social theory, and the 
topic of this chapter: experiments in alternative living. Utopianism poses a productive and 
creative tension between critique (of the status quo) and desire (for something different), whilst 
introducing an element of uncertainty, contingency and (im)possibility.3  
 
This tension of (im)possibility – the good place we can desire and imagine, that nonetheless is no 
place - is the basis of a widespread sentiment of anti-utopianism throughout mainstream politics 
and culture, as well as many traditions of political theory. Criticisms of utopianism arise on two 
fronts. First, there are those who deny the possibility of any alternative to the current capitalist 
economy and neoliberal state politics. This stance is summed up in Francis Fukuyama’s assertion 
that in liberal democracy we have reached ‘the end of history’.4 Liberals such as Karl Popper 
have linked utopianism to totalitarianism since it is presumed to involve a strategy to be executed 
‘all at once’ by ‘a strong centralised leadership.’5 Popper’s critique was specifically aimed at 
Marxism. For Popper, utopias were blueprints that were impervious to change, therefore 
oppressive of dissidents, whilst liberal society should aim for ‘piecemeal’ reformist and gradual 
change. Similarly, colloquial use of the term ‘utopia’ tends to associate it with perfection and 
impossibility. Examples of this understanding abound in popular culture, where societies 
designed on rational principles turn out to be terrifying dystopias in practice, for example in the 
films Demolition Man (1993), Brazil (1985), Blade Runner (1982), High Rise (2015), THX 1138 (1971) 
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and others. Such films often centre on corrupt governments and renegade individuals who refuse 
to conform to stultifying norms. The underlying assumption is that since human beings are 
imperfect, and have different needs and desires, attempts to institute a singular vision of utopia 
from ‘on high’ would be totalitarian and oppress individuality. Of course, these kinds of misfired 
blueprints have nothing to do with anarchism: the implicit critique is usually aimed at Soviet 
Communism, an intensified and illiberal capitalism, or other dictatorial regimes. Nonetheless the 
cultural conflation of anarchism with violent utopianism strikes a misplaced fear in the hearts of 
many, whilst the conflation of utopias with totalitarianism silences and renders invisible true 
anarchist utopias. Thus, the conversational put-down familiar to many anarchists: ‘it sounds great 
in theory, but it wouldn’t work in practice’. 
 
The second front from which the assault on utopianism is issued comes from within the field of 
radical theory. Whilst Marxists have tended to share with anarchists and utopians a critique of 
the current economic system and a revolutionary rather than reformist approach to change, Marx 
himself was critical of the utopian model of social change. His critique was directed at the 
‘utopian socialists’ (who did not themselves use this term), Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles 
Fourier, and Robert Owen who lived in the early 19th century. The utopian socialists drew up 
detailed plans of imaginary societies with the premise that if these were appealing and convincing 
then people of all classes would voluntarily join them. These idealistic plans were even put into 
place in communities such as Robert Owen’s New Harmony and New Lanark and the Fourierist 
Brook Farm.6 Marx and Engels criticized the Utopian Socialists, because unlike their ‘scientific’ 
analysis of material conditions, the utopian socialists did not locate their alternatives within the 
context of existing class struggle, and therefore they were seen to lack an agent of social change.7  
 
Marx and Popper define the field of utopianism differently: Popper’s critique of utopianism was 
aimed at Marxists, whilst Marx believed the utopians were the utopian socialists and anarchists. 
Nonetheless, both classical Marxists and Liberals claim a unifying truth against which deviations 
are labelled ‘utopian’ and derided as impossible, when in fact, both of these modes of theorizing 
have their own utopian visions. Marx’s utopian vision is future-oriented and descriptive; a 
communist society where one can ‘hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the 
evening, criticise after dinner’.8 Not too different then, from the utopias of the ‘utopian socialists’ 
perhaps, as well as the lives of many contemporary communards. It is uncontroversial, in 
contemporary societies contextualised by the collapse of the Soviet Union, to deride Marxist 
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ideals as utopian, yet theorist Ruth Levitas asserts that ‘we have to recognise that utopias are not 
the monopoly of the Left’.9 Contemporary conservative and neoliberal ideologies have their own 
utopian visions. Even though the conservative vision of the future is ostensibly based on 
preservation and restoration of hierarchies and inequalities: ‘there is no doubt that there is an 
image of a desired society here, where there is unquestioned loyalty to the state (and where trade 
union activity is seen as a form of subversion), where there is hierarchy, deference, order, 
centralised power – and, incidentally, where the patriarchal family is the fundamental unit of 
society and where sexuality outside of this has been eliminated’.10 The neoliberal utopia portrays 
unbridled individualism, inexorable technological progress and unlimited natural resources, 
alongside ‘the elimination of the public sphere, total liberation for corporations and skeletal 
social spending’.11 Anarchist utopias, which will be considered in more detail below, can be 
wildly variant but tend to be based on some vision of non-hierarchy, mutual aid, equal 
distribution, non-exploitative production and relationships, individual autonomy and freedom of 
expression.12 
 
Whether we perceive any of these variant visions as positive or negative, utopianism is the 
expression of diverse dreams of a better world, and has the potential to produce effects in the 
world by altering people’s beliefs, values, emotions and actions. Rather than defining utopia in 
terms of form (e.g. fiction or social theory), or content (e.g. conservative or radical), many 
scholars of utopia agree that we should define utopia in terms of its function: ‘the education of 
desire’.13 Utopias and utopianism articulate critique and dissatisfaction (with either the entire 
status quo, or with specific elements within it) as well as desire, for something better. Whilst the 
forms and content of this expression of desire can vary wildly, we need not accept all forms of 
utopia as equally valid, and we may well share the Liberal fear of totalitarian and oppressive 
utopias as well as Marx’s fear that utopias can be purely compensatory and removed from social 
struggle. Yet this does not necessitate that we give up on utopia entirely. 
 
The issue at stake here is epistemological. Both the Liberal and Marxist visions have utopian 
elements, but they are obscured by the ways in which each lays claim to truth – whether this be 
in claiming to know the reality of ‘human nature’ or through having foundations in ‘scientific 
analysis’. There are several problems here. First of all, the claim that some idea might be 
impossible to achieve in practice does not necessarily negate the possibility or desirability of 
trying, which might be a productive or ethically attractive process regardless. It is the truth-
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claiming, rather than the imaginative aspects of utopianism that anarchist anthropologist David 
Graeber argues lies at the heart of violence and oppression: 
Stalinists and their ilk did not kill because they dreamed great dreams … but because 
they mistook their dreams for scientific certainties … In fact all forms of systemic 
violence are (amongst other things) assaults on the role of the imagination as a 
political principle.14  
It is not, then, the lack of a basis in ‘truth’ which makes particular utopias potentially oppressive. 
Rather, the harm resides in the totalising effects of utopias which lay claim to singular and 
unassailable truth, through abstract rationalism, pragmatism, or scientism. The utopias of the 
mainstream have often been as hierarchical and authoritarian as the cultures which produced 
them.15 As the theorist of utopianism, Susan McManus puts it, ‘ostensibly authoritative modes of 
knowledge production, are always-already creative epistemologies … that efface their 
contingency and creative power in favour of their legislative and authoritative power.’16  
 
Other ways of thinking and doing utopia are possible. Tom Moylan and Lucy Sargisson identify 
trends within utopian fiction, which they term ‘critical’17 and ‘transgressive’.18 In these literary 
works, such as Marge Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time, Joanna Russ’ The Female Man and 
Samuel R. Delany’s Triton, the critical and creative function of utopia is not obscured behind 
truth-claims. The societies portrayed do not appear as perfect visions, nor as closed blueprints. 
The authors take great trouble to explore and celebrate themes of difference, deviance and 
dissent. Many of these creative and playful fictional utopias have explored anarchist themes, for 
example Ursula LeGuin’s The Disposessed, Starhawk’s The Fifth Sacred Thing and Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman’s Herland. Such utopias are ‘critical’, Moylan argues, in three ways: they are critical of the 
status quo; they are also self-critical, exploring forms of domination and exclusion that arise from 
within; and they are critical in their aim to produce social change through a critical mass; a 
flourishing of libertarian utopias in all their diverse forms.19  
 
Thinking about the utopian impulse as both a means of expressing and educating desire can help 
us to realise that utopia is not always about the future, nor about impossible blueprints, but 
rather it is something endemic to the present of everyday life. Theorists such as Ernst Bloch 
have interpreted practices as diverse as medicine, fairy tales and architecture as utopian.20 Thus, 
whilst utopias and utopianism are not necessarily anarchist, there is a peculiar resonance between 
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this playful, contingent and experimental function and anarchism, and utopianism has played an 
important role in the history of anarchism.21 Similarly, anarchism has often been associated with 
the impossible and the perilously idealistic, yet seeds of anarchist utopias can be found all around 
us in everyday life.22 Literary critical utopias offer us a useful way in to thinking about the 
political function of lived utopias, because they offer a vision of social change that does not 
separate means from ends; a way to educate desire by experimenting with new ways of living in 
the here-and-now. Such utopias are both possible and pragmatic, whilst engaging concretely in 
social struggle. I will now turn to a consideration of lived and applied aspects of utopianism as 
they relate to anarchism. 
 
The relationship between anarchism and utopia: Why anarchists should be interested in 
intentional communities. 
Literary ‘critical utopias’ such as those mentioned above have a resonance with anarchism. They 
help us to criticise dominant social and political arrangements, imagine alternatives, transgress 
our previously unquestioned beliefs, and in so doing, transform consciousness and ‘educate 
desire’ towards a more liberatory way of life. However there is no denying that reading is usually 
a rather solitary activity, and does not in itself change the world. Utopias in the form of lived 
collective experiments are also possible. The idea of voluntary communities based on shared 
values and principles as forms of social change have been important to anarchist theorists such 
as Max Stirner, who spoke of a ‘union of egoists’;23 Gustav Landauer whose ‘social anarchism’ 
was based on a ‘union of individuals’ who voluntarily founded and joined small socialist 
communities,24 and Martin Buber, who postulated that small communities facilitate ‘a renewal of 
society through its cell tissue’.25 This was based on the premise that the state is not a ‘thing’ that 
can be identified and destroyed in one fell swoop, through revolution, but rather is a particular 
form of dominatory relationship between people,26 or to Stirner, something more akin to an 
alienated internal psychological state; a system of beliefs and values that he termed a ‘spook’.27 
These insidious beliefs and relationships create the conditions for agents of the state to act as 
such, for subjects and subordinates to defer to their authority, and thus for the logic of ‘the state’ 
to continue. The state is theorised as a powerful and dangerous fiction which is perpetrated 
through claims to, and beliefs in, its truth. Buber argued that Marx shared the same goal as 
utopian socialists and anarchists, yet the belief that this goal could be achieved through a top-
down hierarchical revolution was mistaken. For Buber, domination could not be overcome by 
means of further domination. Rather, the best way to overcome the state is through 
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experimentation and practice, or to use a frequently used adage in prefigurative movements: ‘be 
the change you want to see’.28  
 
Many anarchist theorists have studied existing practices through the framework of anarchism, 
even where those practices were not anarchist by intent, for example, Peter Kropotkin’s 
descriptions of mutual aid in primitive and medieval societies29 and Colin Ward’s descriptions of 
anarchy in everyday life.30 Taking an ethnographic approach to studying existing examples of 
anarchy in action should not simply serve the purpose of ‘proving’ anarchist theory to be 
possible or correct. Intentional communities are invaluable for anarchists, because studying 
already-existing ‘utopias’ can provide inspiration for further anarchist practices whilst helping to 
explore problems and tensions that arise in practice. Graeber calls this process ‘utopian 
extrapolation’: ‘a matter of teasing out the tacit logic or principles underlying certain forms of 
radical practice, and then, not only offering the analysis back to those communities, but using 
them to formulate new visions’.31  
 
Intentional Communities as practical utopias 
Intentional communities can be defined as: 
A group of five or more adults and their children, if any, who come from more than 
one nuclear family and who have chosen to live together to enhance their shared 
values or for some other mutually agreed-upon  purpose.32 
The history of intentional communities is rich and varied, spanning centuries and continents, and 
can be traced back to the 6th Century BCE in what is now Southern Italy, where Pythagoras 
founded the community Homakoeion, based on vegetarianism, spirituality and equality of the 
sexes. Around the same time, followers of Buddha joined together to form ashrams to work and 
live together in a spiritual manner.33 Notable movements in the history of intentional 
communities include the Diggers of seventeenth century England, a group of Protestant radicals 
seen as antecedents of modern anarchism, who took their name from their attempts to farm 
common land.34 The utopian socialists of the nineteenth century (discussed above) also deserve a 
mention in this brief history, as well as the counter-cultural movements of the 1960s and 1970s, 
which led to the foundation of several thousand communes throughout the Western world.35 
Many of these were short lived, but a small number continue to this day. That nobody has 
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written a comprehensive history representative of the diversity of the movement worldwide 
attests to the magnitude of such a task. The diversity and scope of intentional communities are 
explored in texts such as Chris Coates’ Utopia Britannica36 for a history of utopian experiments in 
Britain between 1325-1945; the edited book West of Eden37 for a history of intentional 
communities in North California focusing on the 1960s-70s, or James Horrox’ A Living Revolution 
for a history of anarchism in the kibbutz movement of Israel.38  The examples drawn on in this 
chapter are mostly based in the United Kingdom39, and more information on the UK intentional 
communities movement can be found at the Diggers and Dreamers website. 40  Further 
information and a directory of the worldwide intentional communities movement can be found 
on the website of the Fellowship for Intentional Community. 41 
 
Intentional communities can include shared households, cohousing communities, ecovillages, 
communes, survivalist retreats, kibbutzim, ashrams, housing cooperatives, squats. They can be 
urban or rural. The kinds of shared principles that they are based on, similarly to fictional and 
political utopias, are wildly variant and can include political, religious, social or spiritual values 
and practices, and the principles can be as vague as ‘commitment to a shared lifestyle’ or 
‘commitment to shared living’42. Most, but not all intentional communities have a constitution or 
founding document which sets out shared principles, which may or may not be open to 
negotiation and modification by new members. The question of utopian intent is complex and 
has been the subject of debate43. Not all intentional communities are anarchist, though some are 
explicitly inspired by anarchist principles, such as Brambles in Sheffield, UK.44 Most embrace 
equality and non-hierarchy, yet some have been strictly ordered and hierarchical45 whilst others 
prioritise religious or spiritual aims. Some communities, such as Findhorn community in 
Scotland46 and The Catholic Worker Farm in Hertfordshire47 aim to illustrate continuity between 
spirituality and social justice. Communities therefore vary wildly in the values and forms of 
organisation they embrace, and some of these, explicitly or not, are more resonant with anarchist 
theory than others. Of particular relevance for our purpose here are communities that espose 
critique of hierarchy as core values and aim to practice non-hierarchy in their organization and 
decision-making. Intentional communities have frequently been studied as utopian experiments 
and in the context of the utopian studies canon48. However, few communards define their 
practices as utopian, perhaps due to an association of the colloquial understanding of utopia as 
both ‘perfect’ and ‘impossible’. Intentional communities are neither perfect nor impossible. 
Nonetheless, framing their activities as utopian can help us to understand something about them, 




One of the ways in which intentional communities bring anarchist ideals into practice is through 
experimenting with different forms of property relations. The idea that ‘property is theft’ was 
most famously captured by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon,49 yet opposition to both state and 
capitalism unites all anarchists. Anarchists view property as a source of coercive authority and 
tend to favour economies based on mutual aid,50 gift economies51 and ideas of the commons.52 
Intentional communities challenge dominant property narratives that ‘inform modern attitudes, 
beliefs and behaviour about property’.53  
 
Ownership is a complex issue for intentional communities, because whilst they attempt to 
actualise alternative property relations, like other anarchist practices they have to exist within a 
capitalist economy and must assume modes of ownership within or against this.  In the United 
Kingdom, communities experimenting with alternative living, like anyone looking to inhabit a 
space, by necessity assume one of four different practical models of ownership of their space: 
squatting, renting, fully mutual housing co-operatives and private ownership (with or without a 
mortgage). Whilst squatting offers arguably the most integrated critique and resistance to 
capitalist models of ownership, it tends to be a precarious and temporary practice and offers less 
opportunity for sustained and long-term experiments with utopian social relations. Autonomous 
social centres sometimes use squatting and renting, but intentional communities, which often 
aim for stability and longevity, tend to favour the fully mutual housing co-operative model. Fully 
mutual ownership requires a community to own a place either outright or with a mortgage. It is a 
legal model whereby members pay a small fee, usually the legal minimum of £1 in order to 
become a shareholder, whereby they become both landlord and tenant, and are granted 
occupancy subject to the particular rules of the community. Within this legal model, 
communities have evolved richly diverse cultures of co-operative living and alternative property 
relations. If there is a mortgage to be paid, usually members pay ‘cost-share’, a monthly payment 
similar to rent, which will often include shared goods such as food, cleaning products, council 
tax, maintenance and other expenditures. All members are involved in decisions around cost-
share, usually through consensus. There is often an expectation that members will spend a 
certain amount of time working for the co-operative, outside of which members are entitled to 
earn what they like through other jobs. Exceptions exist, such as Findhorn Community, where 
core members are employed full-time by the community. A very small number of communities 
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engage in income sharing, which was popular during the 1960s-70s wave of co-operatives but 
has fallen out of fashion.54 Income sharing involves surrendering one’s personal income to the 
community which is then distributed amongst members according to agreed procedures. 
Although this practice is not widespread, most communities have an ethos of sharing non-
monetary goods and prioritizing the good of community over personal gain. This has deep 
implications for subject-formation, and Sargisson argues that such practices ‘transgress and 
disrupt the egoistic self of possessive individualism’.55 Utopian practices in intentional 
communities disrupt the ontological foundations of widely held beliefs in the naturalness and 
necessity of neoliberal capitalism, illustrating that another world is possible. This highlights a key 
function of utopianism: not only do utopias offer critique, but they are spaces in which we can 
think and do things differently. 
 
Decision-Making 
A key tenet of the anarchist tradition is rejection of political representation: the idea that one 
person can represent others, meaning alienation of choice, expression, action and decision-
making which occurs when political actors speak, campaign, act and decide on behalf of others 
in the political arena. Bakunin criticised representative democracy when it was just an embryonic 
movement. Seen by many as a force for liberation, Bakunin termed it ‘bourgeois democracy’56 
and ‘so-called representative democracy’.57 He argued it was an expression of existent relations of 
inequality, whereby a political elite with privileged access to resources such as wealth, education 
and free time are able to deceive people into thinking it is acting in their interests whereas it is 
‘invariably exploiting them’.58 Max Stirner argued that not only political representation, but any 
form of subjugation to ideas and principles that are not one’s own leads to oppression of 
minorities and self-creativity.59 More recently, Todd May60 and Saul Newman61 have drawn an 
anarchist critique of representation from post-structural theorists such as Derrida, Deleuze and 
Guattari and Foucault. The anarchist critique seems to have gained increasing importance during 
a time that some academic commentators label a ‘crisis of representation’ whereby many publics, 
not only anarchists, are losing faith in the ability of representative democracy to articulate their 
interests.6263 The anarchist alternative to ‘representative democracy’ is sometimes called ‘direct 
democracy’ although some anarchists eschew the term ‘democracy’ altogether, since it means 
‘rule by the people’, and ‘the people’ is an abstraction.64 
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A specific practice associated with anarchism, which attempts to offer an alternative to 
representation, is consensus decision-making. Consensus in its most basic form means that all 
people affected by a decision can take part in deciding, in a face-to-face process, and everyone 
must agree before action is taken. It means that minorities have power to veto and so cannot be 
ignored. Consensus requires commitment to making decisions acceptable to everyone affected 
by the outcome. Instead of choosing between polarised positions through voting, consensus 
involves creatively modifying options through sometimes long processes of negotiation in order 
to take everyone’s needs into account.65 Unlike political representation, consensus does not 
assume unity of identity or desires that can be represented as a single vision. Rather, consensus 
assumes conflict –minorities can veto a decision, so they cannot be ignored. Combining 
perspectives on an issue in both process and outcomes can lead to more creative and effective 
decisions, and the process itself helps to build bonds and community. Consensus requires trust 
and openness, unlike conflict and competition at the basis of parliamentary democracy. All 
participants invest time and energy in the process and all agree so they are more committed to 
implementing the outcome.66  
 
Many intentional communities, whether explicitly anarchist or not, prefer to use consensus for 
making important decisions. Practical details vary from group to group. Usually there is a 
facilitator, whose role is to make sure everyone has equal opportunity to speak and procedures 
are followed. Some groups have informal procedures, simply discussing a subject until everyone 
agrees. Other communities use coloured cards or hand signals, coded to communicate 
agreement, disagreement (blocking a decision), and desire to intervene with a question or 
comment. The purpose of such systems is to minimise talking-over and interrupting. When well 
facilitated, consensus should allow everyone to speak, be listened to and understood, whilst 
louder voices and more assertive personalities should be prevented from dominating the 
proceedings. Some groups have a pre-consensus ‘heart session’ where participants can talk about, 
for example, how their week has been and reveal any personal worries or troubles, with the 
premise that this might ameliorate the possibility of repressed emotions being played out during 
the consensus process.67 
 
Consensus requires small groups to work effectively. Communities visited during my research 
varied from 4 members to about 400. As group size increased, consensus became increasingly 
difficult, and larger communities tended to delegate to sub-groups where possible but use 
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varying forms of majority voting or representation for decisions affecting the entire 
community.68 Critics of anarchism cite this as a reason that anarchism could not work on a ‘large-
scale’.69 However, this misunderstands the anarchist position, which resides precisely in a re-
scaling and dis-alienation of society.70 
 
Scale and Federation 
A further resonance between the intentional communities movement and anarchism resides in 
the idea and practice of networked federation. The best-known anarchist proponent of 
federalism was Proudhon.71 Many other anarchists have based visions on the idea of small and 
diverse self-governing communities associated through networks and loose associations, forming 
non-coercive organizations to communicate.72 Federation is a partial response to the issue of 
scale. Many aspects of anarchism, for example, decentralised production, affinity, community 
and limits on authority require communities not to expand over a certain size. Federation in 
anarchism means that ‘the basic idea is to reproduce the collective, not expand it’.73 The principle 
of small-scale communities is also espoused by eco-anarchists such as Leopold Kohr74 who 
anticipated the deep-ecology movement’s75 preoccupation with bioregions and decentralisation 
through his promotion of ‘human scale’ and small communal life. The issue of size and scale is 
also important in utopian studies. John P. Clark argues that the dominant utopia is based on a 
fantasy of infinite superpower that ‘drives relentlessly toward the destruction of all diversity and 
complexity’76 in the name of progress, whilst anarchist utopias are experimental and connect the 
rich specificity of ‘sense of place’ with diverse cultures and ecosystems.77 Tom Moylan also 
argues that whilst top-down, totalitarian utopias assume a singular jurisdiction over a very large 
area, critical utopianism assumes a proliferation of diverse small-scale experiments, calling for an 
‘alliance of margins without a centre’78. 
 
Many intentional communities practice federation through the organization Radical Routes. 
Radical Routes is ‘a network of radical co-ops whose members are committed to working for 
positive social change’.79 Four times a year, nominated members will attend a gathering at which 
issues affecting co-operatives will be discussed, such as national laws and policies, and new 
applications to join, as well as issues facing groups in financial need (Radical Routes can provide 
loans). The organization’s purpose is to provide ‘a form of structured mutual aid’ that is ‘about 
people taking control of their own housing, work, education and leisure activities’.80 In a very real 
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and practical sense, intentional communities, networked through Radical Routes, are engaged in 
renewing society from the grassroots, here-and-now, as called for by anarchists like Buber and 
Landauer. Nonetheless, there are several controversies and tensions. Debates issue from 
anarchist theory about communal life and from within the communal movement. 
 
Controversies and tensions. 
‘lifestyle anarchism’ vs ‘social anarchism’ 
A key controversy about communities within anarchist theory is somewhat reflective of erstwhile 
tensions between Marx and the Utopian Socialists. Murray Bookchin81 claims to discover two 
trends within contemporary anarchism: ‘Lifestyle anarchism’ and ‘social anarchism’. ‘Lifestyle 
anarchism’, according to Bookchin, is individualistic, bourgeois and immature. It is associated 
with thinkers such as Max Stirner, Emma Goldman, Hakim Bey and John Zerzan, and practices 
such as drug-taking, counter-culture, and celebrating the imagination,82 New Age spirituality and 
critique of technology and science.83 Bookchin argues that it is divorced from social struggle and 
the working classes.84 ‘Lifestyle anarchists’ demand to live anarchy in the present, divorced from 
struggle or revolution, demanding social change through lifestyle changes. Many of these 
descriptors would fit intentional communities. Bookchin counterposes this to ‘social anarchism’, 
which beseeches people ‘to rise in revolution and seek the reconstruction of society’85 with an 
emphasis on mutual responsibility, collectivism, enlightenment rationality, and institutional 
structures.86 
 
Bookchin has been critiqued by post-left anarchist Bob Black, whose book Anarchy after Leftism87 
concentrates on debunking Bookchin. Black argues that Bookchin is a communist in disguise, re-
hashing tired Marxist arguments about the need for top-down social change. Bookchin accuses 
anarchists of hedonism, yet Black argues that anarchism has always been about building the 
future anarchists want to see in the present.88 Whilst Bookchin calls ‘lifestyle anarchism’ 
individualistic, Black argues this is a straw-man concept designed to obfuscate the fact that 
Bookchin is attempting to construct a top-down, rather than anarchist utopia – he wants to 
institute his own idea of the good life. Black proposes the rejection of political tendencies 
associated with leftism, particularly: vanguardism; mass politics; identity politics; representation; 
work; and activism based on guilt, responsibility and repression of desire.89 Instead, post-left 
anarchism favours ‘the immediate expression of desire, constructing the kind of world one wants 
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to live in immanently and horizontally, and radically and antagonistically rejecting or attacking 
the social forms and institutions of the dominant system’90.  
 
In practice, many intentional communities fall somewhere in the middle or outside of this 
theoretical debate. Whilst they do often have a preeminent concern with lifestyle choices and 
‘politicising the quotidian’91, this does not mean they always express their desires immediately, 
live intensely or antagonistically reject dominant social forms in the way described by post-left 
theory. The intentional communities movement has been argued to espouse middle-class values92 
93, yet may have more class diversity than often presumed.94 Many communities are very much 
involved in wider social and political struggles. For example, one community gives up part of its 
space for a refugee shelter, and does a lot of work in refugee advocacy, whilst others open their 
communities for school trips around food and environmental sustainability and justice. 
Individual members dedicate huge amounts of time to education, political protest, direct action, 
radical publishing and many other actions. 
 
Commitment vs temporariness 
Usually, intentional communities require a high degree of commitment in order to produce social 
cohesion and stability.95 Many communities have long joining procedures for this reason.96 For 
example, Mornington Grove community in Bow, East London, outlines a nine-stage joining 
procedure on its website, which it states takes at least six months. They state the reason: ‘we aim 
to be a relatively stable community, and it takes time and energy to join and get to know the 
ropes, we ask all new members to make a commitment to stay for two years.’97 However, Hakim 
Bey, a post-left anarchist, argues in his book Temporary Autonomous Zone98 that anarchist 
communities, which he terms ‘intentional communities’ and ‘pirate utopias’,99 ought to be short-
lived and exceptional, in order to preserve levels of intensity required for radicalism, and to 
prevent ossification into fixed structures and stable hierarchies: ‘Like festivals, uprisings cannot 
happen every day — otherwise they would not be ‘nonordinary.’ But such moments of intensity 
give shape and meaning to the entirety of a life’100. Conversely, Stephven Shukaitis has argued it 
is precisely this embedding of anarchist principles into ‘ordinary’ everyday life that constitutes 
their value and the sustainable ‘social reproduction’ of anarchist ways of living.101  This involves 
activities like caring for the young and elderly, which tend to require some degree of communal 
stability and longevity. Furthermore, Shukaitis argues it is very much the case that struggles 
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around the everyday and ‘ordinary’ can connect ‘minor moments of rupture and rebellion into 
connected networks of struggle’.102 Of course, it is quite possible that both these modes of 
resistance are important, for example communities in squats tend to be more temporary, yet 
more radical in their ability to highlight and resist exploitative property relations, whilst also 
better suited for people in precarious circumstances. Whilst some degree of stability is important 
for many communards, it is likely Kanter overstates the case by defining the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ 
of an intentional community in terms of its longevity, since even short-lived communities can be 
intensely meaningful to those who participated. 
 
‘Tyranny of structurelessness’ vs ‘tyranny of tyranny’ 
The term ‘tyranny of structurelessness’ is drawn from an article by Jo Freeman, which is widely 
cited as an idea, sometimes even by people who are not aware of the text, in activist circles 
including intentional communities. Freeman’s analysis, written from within the 1970s feminist 
movement, revolves around the idea that informal groups without clear organisational structures 
are susceptible to power struggles and undemocratic hierarchies. She argues that a lack of formal 
structure encourages ‘unquestioned hegemony’103 since it leads to the formation of elites, where 
cliques of friends dominate groups, and encourages a ‘”Star” system’ where charismatic members 
are perceived to be representatives without undergoing democratic election104. Her final criticism 
is that informal groups are not politically effective, and are only useful for a ‘consciousness-
raising’ phase, rather than for achieving real change.105 She proceeds to outline seven 
recommendations for ‘democratic structuring’, including: delegation of authority for specific 
tasks by democratic procedures; requiring those in authority to be responsible to those who 
selected them; distribution of authority among ‘as many people as is reasonably possible’; 
rotation of tasks; allocation of tasks along rational criteria; frequent diffusion of information; and 
equal access to resources (Freeman 1984[1972]: 14-15).106 
 
In reply to this essay, Cathy Levine argues from an anarchist perspective that small, structureless 
groups are not ineffective and unintentionally oppressive, but rather ‘a valid, conscious strategy 
for building a revolutionary movement’ and are in fact less tyrannical than the organized 
democratic groups Freeman recommends.107 The anarchist ideal of ‘small groups in voluntary 
organization’108 is the antidote to mass hierarchical organisations with centralised control - such 
as capitalist, imperialist states - but also, Levine argues, traditionally patriarchal Left party politics. 
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For Levine, consciousness-raising is the very core of political movement, which should not 
concentrate on a power takeover, but rather become a matter of building a women’s culture 
from the bottom-up. 
 
This debate has a lot of relevance and reflects debates within intentional communities. Many, if 
not all, communities encounter issues whereby some individuals dominate certain situations, and 
unintentional hierarchies arise, often based on gender, education, longevity (in the group) and 
confidence.109 This of course takes place everywhere in everyday life, yet arguably there is more 
reflexivity in intentional communities, who tend to discuss these matters. Furthermore, 
intentional communities do tend already to adopt many of Freeman’s principles, for example, it 
is impractical to bring all decisions to meetings, so there is delegation to sub-collectives (for 
example, there may be a sub-collective for permaculture gardening and another for buildings 
maintenance). Groups also have formal organizational procedures laid out in constitutional 
documents. This ought not to be taken as straightforward vindication of Freeman against 
Levine’s more anarchist line of thought. Jason McQuinn has claimed: ‘each of [Freeman’s] 
suggestions are far more commonly accomplished by informal libertarian groups than by any … 
of the formal organizations of the world, including formal anarchist organizations. And they can 
be recommended for any organization, whether it’s formal or informal.’110 Thus Freeman’s 
principles are already anarchist principles, except, McQuinn argues, her two suggestions that are 
‘explicitly based on authoritarian assumptions’;111 those are: ‘distribution of authority among as 
many people as is reasonably possible’ and ‘requiring those in authority to be responsible to 
those who selected them’112 which simply describe the very kinds of representative democracy 
and political authority that anarchists are against. Similarly to anarchists, intentional communities 
tend to reject political authority and representation, and in the preceding sections I have 
attempted to read anarchism in and through the organizational processes of intentional 
communities. However, this approach does raise some issues, which will be addressed in the 
conclusion. 
 




Intentional communities vary drastically in how they are organized, the ideals and values they 
follow, whether they are urban or rural, the ways in which they arrange and occupy space, and 
their relationships to ownership, property and production. There is no single model, and not all 
intentional communities are anarchist, nor even broadly libertarian or leftist. Nonetheless, there 
are many utopian threads that weave through intentional communities and anarchism. The 
histories of both movements are tied together through the ideas and practices of utopian 
socialists, theorists, hippies, feminists and a host of other characters seeking a better way of 
living. Throughout this history, anarchists, utopians and communards have been subject to the 
same invalidating criticisms: that their values are idealistic and their very real, embodied practices 
and experiences are ‘impossible’. At the same time anarchists and utopian communards have 
shared a positive vision: of grassroots, bottom-up social change, which starts in the here-and-
now, transforming relationships and consciousness, rather than being deferred to the future, 
which takes the form of continually evolving experiments rather than totalitarian blue-prints. 
Small groups, face-to-face relationships, and dis-alienated relations with nature are the bedrock 
of many anarchist utopias, and intentional communities bring these into practice. 
 
Utopianism as a methodology operates through critique and transgression, which has a 
consciousness-raising function. Both anarchism and intentional communities arise from a 
context where certain assumptions are taken-for-granted: that a key purpose of the state is to 
protect (unequal) property relations; effective decisions can only be made when political 
authority is delegated to a representative; and the essential territorial scale of a political entity is 
the nation state. The nation state is often taken to be a natural or inevitable political entity rather 
than something that is itself politically constructed113, and the necessity of a state with a 
monopoly on the use of violence to protect private property rests on essential claims about 
‘human nature’ which are actually contestible. These truth claims – about what it is to be human, 
and to belong, obfuscate political desires and interests behind truth-claiming discourse. 
Intentional communities posit alternatives: gift-economies, face-to-face relationships and 
consensus decisions in small, loosely federated groups. In so doing, they de-naturalise taken-for-
granted assumptions about human nature, economy and belonging. This is a self-avowedly 
utopian approach, which attempts to embrace and harmonise different desires, and take 
everyone’s needs and interests into account. The approach is one of voluntarism and 
experimentalism: many flowers may bloom with no single over-arching approach to either 
epistemology or politics of community. 
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Anarchism fits quite well as an epistemological approach to understanding such communities, 
but utopianism and the intentional communities movement are much broader than anarchism. 
The relationship is perhaps best thought of as rhizomic, rather than foundational or definitional. 
To restrict one’s analysis to communities that explicitly named themselves anarchist would leave 
a very small number of cases. Therefore, when working with intentional communities one 
frequently finds oneself interpreting practices as anarchist that practitioners might not self-define 
as such. This can be a useful exercise, as intentional communities have much to offer anarchism, 
and vice versa. Nonetheless, we must be careful not to ‘colonise’ practices and practitioner 
perspectives by representing them only using ideals and terminology that are not their own. 
Furthermore, one risks compromising anarchist values by reading certain practices uncritically as 
anarchism, when in fact they might fall short. Many community members have carefully 
considered personal perspectives, frequently inspired by, reacting to, and in dialogue with their 
encounters with anarchism and anarchists through their communities and other radical networks. 
Perhaps the most important lesson to be drawn from the intentional communities movement are 
the possibilities for connection and affinity between our wider anarchist movements and 
intentional communities, as well as the possibility of taking inspiration from intentional 
communities for practices we can bring to our own unintentional communities, classrooms, 
neighbourhoods and relationships. 
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